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Commentaries

No. 1 (2024)

Three approaches to overcome compartmentalization: A brief epistemological analysis

DOI
https://doi.org/10.3280/rpc1-2024oa17127
Submitted
gennaio 10, 2024
Published
2024-10-15

Abstract

The authors of the target article (Salvatore et al., 2022) provided an in-depth analysis of the features and the causes of professional psychology’s fragmentation, generally referred to as compartmentalization. The present contribution is a critical reflection on the three approaches aimed at overcoming it. In conclusion, some preliminary remarks are presented regarding the primary components that a theory of practice should encompass.

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