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FrancoAngeli Journals

Articles

No. 1 (2019): Special Issue "Best practice and future trends in Corporate Governance"

Say on pay in Italy: a few reflections in view of the adoption of the SRD II Directive

DOI
https://doi.org/10.3280/cgrds1-2019oa8425
Submitted
settembre 12, 2019
Published
2020-02-07

Abstract

Our work focuses on the analysis of the impacts deriving from the introduction of the legislation on say on pay, on the governance of Italian listed companies, through the examination of the remuneration reports published in 2012 and 2019 by a sample of leading FTSE MIB companies. Seven years after the introduction of such legislation, it seemed useful to highlight, albeit on a purely illustrative level, the evolution of the approach adopted in designing remuneration policies and disclosing them to the market, in addition to managing relations with shareholders on executive remuneration issues, without neglecting the role assumed by the remuneration committees. This with the aim of outlining the steps taken and the way  still to go in view of the implementation of the measures envisaged by Directive (EU) 828/2017, which will entail significant changes to the processes for defining and approving the remuneration policies for the directors of the listed companies.

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