La psicoretorica, la funzione interpretativa e l’enigma del pensiero: bias vs. insight

Laura Macchi

doi:10.3280/rndoa2025oa22294

Saggi

V. 158 N. 3 (2025): Rendiconti. Classe di Scienze morali

La psicoretorica, la funzione interpretativa e l’enigma del pensiero: bias vs. insight

Laura Macchi

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.3280/rndoa2025oa22294
Inviata: 24 marzo 2026
Pubblicato: 28-05-2026

Abstract

Come può un determinato modo di argomentare riuscire a orientare il pensiero? Come influisce la formulazione di una domanda sulla risposta, producendo un bias o un insight? Questo contributo illustra il ruolo giocato dalla dimensione retorica e dai meccanismi della comunicazione nella psicologia del pensiero e della decisione e del problem solving. Esso dà voce a un approccio non convenzionale al dibattito contemporaneo nell’ambito della psicologia del pensiero che ha profonde implicazioni per fenomeni comportamentali chiave, tra cui bias, creatività, processi decisionali e politiche pubbliche. Questo approccio innovativo sfida la convinzione tradizionale, proponendo che i bias cognitivi non siano manifestazioni di deficit strutturali del sistema cognitivo umano, ma piuttosto il risultato di patterns di comunicazione fuorvianti che influenzano i nostri processi di pensiero. Questo approccio alla psicologia del pensiero ha implicazioni significative per la creatività e i processi decisionali, muovendosi verso una concezione adattiva e genuinamente psicologica di razionalità.

Riferimenti bibliografici

Bagassi M. and Macchi L. (2016). The interpretative function and the emergence of unconscious analytic thought. In: Frankish K. (ed.), Cognitive unconscious and human rationality, Cambridge: Mit Press, 43-76.
Barbey A.K. and Sloman S.A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes. In: «Behavioral and Brain Sciences», 30(3): 241-254.
Frankish K. and Evans J.S.B.T. (2009). The duality of mind: An historical perspective. In: Evans J.S.B.T. and Frankish K.E., In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, New York: Oxford University Press, 1-29.
Grice H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In: Cole P. and Morgan J.L. (eds.), Syntax and Semantics. Leiden: Brill, 41-58.
Kahneman D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. In: «American Psychologist», 58(9): 697-720.
Id. (2011). Thinking: Fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Levinson S.C. (1995). Interactional bias in human thinking. In: Goody E.N. (ed.), Social intelligence and interaction. Cambridge: University Press, 221-261.
Macchi L. (1995). Pragmatic aspects of the base-rate fallacy. In: «The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology», 48(1): 188-207.
Ead. (2000). Partitive formulation of information in probabilistic problems: Beyond heuristics and frequency format explanations. In: «Organizational behavior and human decision processes», 82(2): 217-236.
Ead. (2024). La psicoretorica. Dall’arte del dire alla forma del pensiero. Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore.
Ead. (2026). Psychorhetoric and the psychology of thought. Oxfordshire-New York: Routledge Psychology.
Ead. and Bagassi M. (2012). Intuitive and analytical processes in insight problem solving: A psycho-rhetorical approach to the study of reasoning. In: «Mind & Society», 11(1): 53-67.
Ead. and Bagassi M. (2014). The interpretative heuristic in insight problem solving. In: «Mind & Society», 13(1): 97-108.
Ead. and Bagassi M. (2015). When analytic thought is challenged by a misunderstanding. In: «Thinking & Reasoning», 21(1): 147-164.
Ead., Caravona L., Poli F., Bagassi M. and Franchella M. (2020). Speak your mind and I will make it right: the case of “selection task”. In: «Journal of Cognitive Psychology», 32(1): 93-107.
Ead., Poli F., Caravona L., Vezzoli M., Franchella M. and Bagassi M. (2019). How to get rid of the belief bias: Boosting analytical thinking via pragmatics. In: «Europe’s Journal of Psychology», 15(3): 595-613.
Mach E. (1914). The analysis of sensations. Chicago: Open Court.
Maffei L. (2012). La libertà di essere diversi. Bologna: il Mulino.
Mosconi G. (1978). Il pensiero discorsivo. Bologna: il Mulino
Id. (1990). Discorso e pensiero. Bologna: il Mulino.
Id. and Macchi L. (2001). The role of pragmatic rules in the conjunction fallacy. In: «Mind & Society», 2(1): 31-57.
Politzer G. and Macchi L. (1999). Reasoning and Pragmatics. In: «Mind & Society», 1 (1): 73-94.
Schooler J.W., Smallwood J., Christoff K., Handy T.C., Reichle E.D. and Sayette M.A.
(2011). Meta-awareness, perceptual decoupling and the wandering mind. In: «Trends in Cognitive Sciences», 15: 319-326.
Simon H.A. and Newell A. (1971) / Simon H.A (1979). Models of thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Stanovich K.E. and West R.F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?. In: «Behavioral and brain sciences», 23(5): 645-665.
Wason P.C. (1966). Reasoning. In: Foss B.M. (ed.), New horizons in psychology 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 135-151.

Come citare

Macchi, L. (2026). La psicoretorica, la funzione interpretativa e l’enigma del pensiero: bias vs. insight. «Rendiconti» Istituto Lombardo Accademia Di Scienze E Lettere, 158(3). https://doi.org/10.3280/rndoa2025oa22294

[1] Bagassi M. and Macchi L. (2016). The interpretative function and the emergence of unconscious analytic thought. In: Frankish K. (ed.), Cognitive unconscious and human rationality, Cambridge: Mit Press, 43-76.

[2] Barbey A.K. and Sloman S.A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual processes. In: «Behavioral and Brain Sciences», 30(3): 241-254.

[3] Frankish K. and Evans J.S.B.T. (2009). The duality of mind: An historical perspective. In: Evans J.S.B.T. and Frankish K.E., In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, New York: Oxford University Press, 1-29.

[4] Grice H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In: Cole P. and Morgan J.L. (eds.), Syntax and Semantics. Leiden: Brill, 41-58.

[5] Kahneman D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. In: «American Psychologist», 58(9): 697-720.

[6] Id. (2011). Thinking: Fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

[7] Levinson S.C. (1995). Interactional bias in human thinking. In: Goody E.N. (ed.), Social intelligence and interaction. Cambridge: University Press, 221-261.

[8] Macchi L. (1995). Pragmatic aspects of the base-rate fallacy. In: «The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology», 48(1): 188-207.

[9] Ead. (2000). Partitive formulation of information in probabilistic problems: Beyond heuristics and frequency format explanations. In: «Organizational behavior and human decision processes», 82(2): 217-236.

[10] Ead. (2024). La psicoretorica. Dall’arte del dire alla forma del pensiero. Milano: Raffaello Cortina Editore.

[11] Ead. (2026). Psychorhetoric and the psychology of thought. Oxfordshire-New York: Routledge Psychology.

[12] Ead. and Bagassi M. (2012). Intuitive and analytical processes in insight problem solving: A psycho-rhetorical approach to the study of reasoning. In: «Mind & Society», 11(1): 53-67.

[13] Ead. and Bagassi M. (2014). The interpretative heuristic in insight problem solving. In: «Mind & Society», 13(1): 97-108.

[14] Ead. and Bagassi M. (2015). When analytic thought is challenged by a misunderstanding. In: «Thinking & Reasoning», 21(1): 147-164.

[15] Ead., Caravona L., Poli F., Bagassi M. and Franchella M. (2020). Speak your mind and I will make it right: the case of “selection task”. In: «Journal of Cognitive Psychology», 32(1): 93-107.

[16] Ead., Poli F., Caravona L., Vezzoli M., Franchella M. and Bagassi M. (2019). How to get rid of the belief bias: Boosting analytical thinking via pragmatics. In: «Europe’s Journal of Psychology», 15(3): 595-613.

[17] Mach E. (1914). The analysis of sensations. Chicago: Open Court.

[18] Maffei L. (2012). La libertà di essere diversi. Bologna: il Mulino.

[19] Mosconi G. (1978). Il pensiero discorsivo. Bologna: il Mulino

[20] Id. (1990). Discorso e pensiero. Bologna: il Mulino.

[21] Id. and Macchi L. (2001). The role of pragmatic rules in the conjunction fallacy. In: «Mind & Society», 2(1): 31-57.

[22] Politzer G. and Macchi L. (1999). Reasoning and Pragmatics. In: «Mind & Society», 1 (1): 73-94.

[23] Schooler J.W., Smallwood J., Christoff K., Handy T.C., Reichle E.D. and Sayette M.A.

[24] (2011). Meta-awareness, perceptual decoupling and the wandering mind. In: «Trends in Cognitive Sciences», 15: 319-326.

[25] Simon H.A. and Newell A. (1971) / Simon H.A (1979). Models of thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

[26] Stanovich K.E. and West R.F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?. In: «Behavioral and brain sciences», 23(5): 645-665.

[27] Wason P.C. (1966). Reasoning. In: Foss B.M. (ed.), New horizons in psychology 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 135-151.