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Essays

Vol. 158 No. 3 (2025): Rendiconti. Class of Moral Sciences

Psychorhetoric, the interpretive function and the enigma of thought: bias versus insight

  • Laura Macchi
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3280/rndoa2025oa22294
Submitted
marzo 24, 2026
Published
2026-05-28

Abstract

How can a particular way of argumenting direct our thinking? How does the formulation of a question influence the answer, producing a bias or an insight? And finally, what effect does public communication have on public behavior? This contribution illustrates the role played by rhetoric and communication mechanisms in the psychology of thinking, decision-making, and problem solving.  It gives voice to an unconventional approach to the contemporary debate within the psychology of thought  that has wide implications for key behavioural phenomena, including biases, creativity, decision making and public policy. This innovative approach challenges traditional belief by proposing that cognitive biases are not inherent flaws in human cognition, but rather outcomes of misleading communication patterns that influence our thinking processes. This unconventional approach to the psychology of thought has significant implications for creativity and decision making, moving toward an adaptive and genuinely psychological conception of rationality.

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